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THE NEGRO IN THE SUPREME COURT:
FIVE YEARS MORE
EDWARD F. VWAITE*F IVE YEARS AGO there were reviewed in these pages all the opin-
ions of the Supreme Court of the United States involving dis-
crimination against Negroes on racial grounds from Bleyew v.
United States' to Railway Mail Association v. Corsi,2 a period of
approximately three-quarters of a century. The cases were pre-
sented in chronological order and showed slow, but in the main,
consistent progress toward liberal interpretations. To the seventy-
seven decisions handed down with opinions during the period thus
covered, the succeeding five years have added twenty.
Racially Restrictive Covenants
Of these later cases two seem to be of prime importance,
Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Moore,4 decided the same day,
May 3, 1948. The Chief Justice wrote the opinions and Justices
Reed, Jackson and Rutledge took no part. The point involved was
the enforceability of racially restrictive covenants for the convey-
ance or occupancy of real estate. The hotly contested case of
Buchanan v. Warleyf had disposed of such discrimination by state
law or local ordinance, but the judicial enforcement of private
agreements to the same end remained an open question. In the
next twenty years one case skirted its edge but did not get over
the line." Now, in the Shelley case,7 this point had to be met and
*Judge of the District Court for the Fourth District, Minnesota, 1911-
1941 (retired).
1. 13 Wall. 581 (U.S. 1872).
2. 326 U. S. 88 (1945).
3. 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
4. 334 U. S. 24 (1948).
5. 245 U. S. 60 (1917).
6. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 (1926).
7. Certiorari from Supreme Court of Missouri; heard with McGhee v.
Sikes, certiorari from Supreme Court of Michigan.
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decided: Conceding that under previous decisions the 14th Amend-
ment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory and wrongful," and that, as had been held repeated-
ly, racially restrictive agreements are not unconstitutional and in-
valid for that reason, is their judicial enforcement state action
within the prohibition of the amendment? After reviewing the
relevant cases, beginning with Ex parte Virginia," the six judges
sitting in the case unanimously decided this question in the af-
firmative.
The question of enforceability is approached from a different
angle in the Hurd case.9 Since the 14th Amendment does not apply
to the District of Columbia the Shelley case was not directly deci-
sive, and the decree below was attacked under the 5th Amendment
and on other grounds. The Court side-stepped the constitutional
question, and found that Revised Statute Section 1978 prohibited
the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. The section pro-
vides:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens there-
of to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property."
This language was found to be derived from Section one of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was under discussion in Congress
when it was considering the Joint Resolution resulting in the 14th
Amendment. In the light of this historical relationship the Court
held "that the action of the District Court directed against the
Negro purchasers and the white sellers denies rights intended by
Congress to be protected by the Civil Rights Act."
The concluding language of the opinion is so far-reaching in its
import that it must be quoted:
"But even in the absence of the statute, there are other con-
siderations which would indicate that enforcement of restrictive
covenants in these cases is judicial action contrary to the pub-
lic policy of the United States, and as such should be corrected
by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers over
the courts of the District of Columbia. The power of the federal
courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times
exercised subject to the restrictions of the public policy of the
United States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, fed-
eral statutes and applicable legal precedents. We are here con-
cerned with action of the federal courts of such nature that if
taken by the courts of a State would violate the prohibitory
8. 100 U. S. 339 (1880).
9. Certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, heard with Urciola v. Hodge, certiorari from the same court.
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provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Citing Shelley v.
Kraemer). It is not consistent with the public policy of the
United States to permit federal courts in the Nation's capital
to exercise general equitable powers to compel action denied the
state courts where such state action has been held to be viola-
tive of the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. We
cannot presume that the public policy of the United States
manifests a lesser concern for the protection of such basic
rights against discriminatory action of the federal courts than
against such action taken by the courts of the States."' 0
Justice Frankfurter filed a brief concurring opinion to the effect that
he considered that general equitable principles furnished "a suffi-
cient and conclusive ground for reaching the Court's result."
A review of the decisions in this field shows the cautious but
consistent way in which the Court has reached the important step
taken in these recent cases. Buchanan v. Warley was decided
squarely under the 14th Amendment. There could be no doubt
that a municipal ordinance was action by the state. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was referred to only as "giving legislative aid"
to constitutional provisions, and was not mentioned in the official
syllabus. Corrigan v. Buckley"' was a suit in equity in the District
of Columbia to enjoin conveyance of real estate in violation of a
racially restrictive covenant. The decision sustaining the injunc-
tion decreed by the court below reasserted the well established
doctrine that the 14th Amendment prohibited stated action only,
which was not involved in the case. It further held that the record
showed no claim by appellants for relief under the Civil Rights
Acts, and that neither these Acts, nor considerations of public
policy urged as invalidating the covenant, brought the case within
Section 250 of the Judicial Code allowing an appeal. The case was
therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In their brief, coun-
sel for appellants claimed that the covenant was of such discrimina-
tory character that a court of equity ought not lend its aid by en-
forcing specific performance. This point was held not reviewable
under the appeal unless jurisdiction of the case was otherwise
obtained.
The Shelley case made a great advance in holding that "in
granting judicial enforcement of [restrictive covenants involving
racial discrimination] the states acted to deny petitioners the equal
protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2
10. Hurd v. Moore, 334 U. S. 24, 34-36 (1948).
11. 271 U. S. 323 (1926).
12. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U, S. 1 (1948) (official syllabus, para-
graph (c)).
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In Hurd, the 14th Amendment not being available the Court re-
sorted to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and also applied the "public
policy" doctrine; while Justice Frankfurter would have reached
the same result under general equitable principles.
State Institutions of Professional and Higher Education
In 1948 the Gaines case' 3 was applied as conclusive authority
in a per curiam decision involving the admission of a Negro woman
student to the Law School of the University of Oklahoma. 14 In
1950 further progress was made in two very important cases,
Sweatt v. Painter5 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of
Regents,'6 where the Court spoke what it may be hoped is the
final word as to "equality" in the field of professional *and higher
education. In that field the noxious trail of Pdessy v. Ferguson'7
seems to have reached an end. In each case the opinion was written
by the Chief Justice and the decision was unanimous.
A summarized but sufficient statement of the facts and holding
in the Sweatt case is found in the syllabus:
"Petitioner was denied admission to the state-supported Uni-
versity of Texas Law School, solely because he is a Negro and
state law forbids the admission of Negroes to that Law School.
He was offered, but he refused, enrollment in a separate law
school newly established by the State for Negroes. The Uni-
versity of Texas Law School has sixteen full-time and three
part-time professors, 850 students, a library of 65,000 volumes,
a law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, an Order
of the Coif affiliation, many distinguished alumni, and much
tradition and prestige. The separate law school for Negroes has
five full-time professors, 23 students, a library of 16,520 vol-
umes, a practice court, a legal aid association and one alumnus
admitted to the Texas Bar; but it excludes from its student body
members of racial groups which number 85% of the popula-
tion of the State and which include most of the lawyers, wit-
nesses, jurors, judges, and other officials with whom petitioner
would deal as a member of the Texas Bar. Held: The legal
education offered petitioner is not substantially equal to that
which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas
Law School; and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that he be admitted to the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School.""'
13. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
14. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948).
15. 339 U. S. 629 (1950).
16. 339 U. S. 637 (1950).
17. 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
18. The Minnesota Law Review has made available (Vol. 34 at 289)
(Vol. 35:625
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The McLaurin case is full of "human interest," but the writer
again contents himself with presenting the syllabus:
"Appellant, a Negro citizen of Oklahoma possessing a master's
degree, was admitted to the Graduate School of the state-
supported University of Oklahoma as a candidate for a doc-
torate in education and was permitted to use the same class-
room, library and cafeteria as white students. Pursuant to a
requirement of state law that the instruction of Negroes in state
institutions of higher education be 'upon a segregated basis,'
however, he was assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row
specified for Negro students, was assigned to a special table in
the library, and though permitted to eat in the cafeteria at the
same time as other students, was assigned to a special table
there. Held: The conditions under which appellant is required
to receive his education deprive him of his personal and present
right to the equal protection of the laws; and the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes such differences in treatment by the
State based upon race.
(a) The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and in-
hibit his ability to study, to engage in discussion and ex-
change views with other students, and, in general, to learn
his profession.
(b) That appellant may still be set apart by his fellow-students
and may be in no better position when these restrictions
are removed is irrelevant, for there is a constitutional dif-
ference between restrictions imposed by the State, which
prohibit the intellectual commingling of students and the
refusal of students to commingle where the State presents
no such bar.
(c) Having been admitted to a state-supported graduate school,
appellant must receive the same treatment at the hands of
the State as students of other races."
Forward-looking Americans may well take courage when they
find the following paragraph in this unanimous opinion of their
highest judicial tribunal:
"Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for
trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case rep-
resents, perhaps, the epitome of that need, for he is attempting
to obtain an advanced degree in education to become, by defi-
nition, a leader and trainer of others. Those who will come un-
der his guidance and influence must be directly affected by the
education he receives. Their own education and development
will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal
the valuable brief filed on behalf of the Committee of Law Teachers as
amicus curiae against Segregation in Legal Education. The brief was signed
by distinguished members of the faculty of six leading law schools, and urged
complete repudiation of the Plessy case.
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to that of his classmates. State-imposed restrictions which pro-
duce such inequalities cannot be sustained."'19
Perhaps indicative of the trend is the result in a recent case
which arose when the management of a public golf course adopted
a rule restricting to one day per week the use of the course by Negro
players, and allowing exclusive use by white players on other days.
The Supreme Court of Florida denied mandamus to require ad-
mission of Negroes at all times when the course was open to other
players. In a per curiam decision the United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment below and remanded the cause "for con-
sideration in the light of" the Sweatt and McLaurin cases.l9a
Racial Discrimination by Carriers of Passengers
Many difficult questions have come before the Supreme Court
under the doctrine announced in the first "Jim Crow" case2O in
construing the "commerce clause" of the Constitution-that so long
as Congress has not legislated on the subject of racial discrimina-
tion in interstate transportation of passengers the states are at
liberty to enact, and carriers to adopt, "reasonable rules and regu-
lations f6r the disposition of passengers." A Louisiana statute
(enacted during "Reconstruction" days) forbidding "discrimina-
tion on account of race or color" was declared invalid solely on
the ground that it imposed "a direct burden," involving "great
inconvenience and unnecessary hardship," on interstate commerce.
"If the public good requires such legislation," said the Court, "it
must come from Congress and not from the States." Later, in the
Civil Rights Cases2 ' the Court took pains to say that it was not then
decided "whether Congress, in its power to regulate commerce
amongst the several states, might or might not pass a law regulat-
ing rights in public conveyances passing from one State to an-
other." Congress took a step in that direction by including in the
original Interstate Commerce Law,22 language which was at once
construed by the Interstate Commerce Commission as applicable
to inequalities of accommodations and treatment between white
and Negro passengers as individuals, and formed the basis of the
Court's important decision in the Mitchell case" in 1941.
19. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, 339 U. S. 637.
641 (1950).
19a. Rice v. Arnold, 340 U. S. 848 (1950).
20. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 3, 19 (1877).
21. 109 U. S. 19, 27 (1883).
22. 24 Stat. 380 (1887).
23. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941).
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In May, 1942, a Negro employee of the United States, en route
from Washington to Atlanta on a first-class ticket over the South-
ern Railway, was refused service in the dining car under the rules
of the railway company, requiring discrimination on racial grounds
alone. He filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion alleging a violation of the amended Interstate Commerce Act,
Section 3(1), which made it unlawful for a railway engaged in
interstate commerce "to subject any particular person ... to any
undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatever."2 4 He won a Pyrrhic victory which did not satisfy him,
and kept up the fight through various proceedings for eight years.
Modified regulations of the railway company, still discriminatory,
were before the Court in Henderson v. United States.25 Justice
Burton wrote the opinion; Justice Douglas concurred in the result
without opinion; Justice Clark took no part.
A few lines from the opinion will disclose the nature of the
discriminations which were attacked and the broad spirit in which
they were considered:
"The right to be free from unreasonable discriminations be-
longs, under Section 3(1), to each particular person. Where a
dining car is available to passengers holding tickets entitling
them to use it, each such passenger is equally entitled to its
facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations. The denial
of dining service to any such passenger by the rules before us
subjects him to a prohibited disadvantage. Under the rules,
only four Negro passengers may be served at one time and then
only at the table reserved for Negroes. Other Negroes who
present themselves are compelled to await a vacancy at that
table, although there may be many vacancies elsewhere in the
diner. The railroad thus refuses to extend to those passengers
the use of its existing and unoccupied facilities. . . . The cur-
tains, partitions and signs emphasize the artificiality of a dif-
ference in treatment which serves only to call attention to a
racial classification of passengers holding identical tickets and
using the same public dining facility. . . . They violate Sec-
tion 3(1).1128
While Elmer Henderson was fighting for his rights (and inci-
24. 54 Stat. 902, 49 U. S. C. § 3(1) (1946).
25. 339 U. S. 816 (1950).
26. Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816, 824, 825 (1950). And
there is a significant citation of the McLaurin case, supra. Contrast this
standard of "reasonable" discrimination with convenience of the carrier, as
in Hall v. De Cuir, supra, and later cases; "local usages, traditions and
customs," as in the Plessy case, supra, and later cases, notably Chiles v.
C. & 0. Ry., 218 U. S. 71 (1910), where the official syllabus declared that-
"Regulations which are induced by the general sentiment of the community
for whom they are made and upon whom they operate cannot be said to be
unreasonable." (Italics added.)
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dentally those of other Negro travelers) under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, a Negro woman became involved in an experience
under the Virginia Code which again brought the troublesome
question of "undue burden on commerce" before the Supreme
Court,-this time from a direction precisely opposite to Hall v.
De Cuir. She was traveling 'bus from a point in Virginia through
the District of Columbia to Baltimore, the destination of the 'bus.
On her refusal to accede to the request of the driver, made pursuant
to the terms of Section 4097, Virginia Code 1942, to move from
her seat to a back seat which was already occupied by other Negro
passengers, so as to permit the seat she vacated to be used by a
white passenger, she was arrested, tried and convicted of a mis-
demeanor under the section cited. The question considered .by the
Supreme Court on appeal from the affirmance of the conviction by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia was whether that decision
was repugnant to Article I, § 8(3) of the Constitution. The Court
held that it was, Justice Reed writing the opinion, reviewing many
cases more or less analogous, and finding "a recognized abstract
principle that may be taken as a postulate for testing whether par-
ticular state legislation in the absence of action by Congress 27 is
beyond state power. This is that state legislation is invalid if it
unduly burdens that commerce in matters where uniformity is
necessary-necessary in the constitutional sense of useful in ac-
complishing a permitted purpose. Where uniformity is essential
for the functioning of commerce, a state may not impose its local
regulation." 2 To many readers the Court's discussion of the facts
which are held to bring the Virginia law within the prohibited area
will seem somewhat labored.2" The Court concludes:
"It seems clear to us that seating arrangements for the different
races in interstate travel require a single, uniform rule to pro-
mote and protect rational travel. Consequently we hold the
Virginia statute in controversy invalid." 30
27. There has been no federal legislation on the subject of racial segre-
gation in travel by common carrier. The provision in the Interstate Com-
merce Law above referred to was of individual application only.
28. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 377 (1946).
29. The items mentioned are that a passenger who has to sit in a desig-
nated seat while in Virginia may occupy any available seat after crossing the
D. C. line; that this involves inconvenience which may be especially disturbing
in night travel; that throughout the United States there are variations in laws
respecting separation of the races in interstate travel, some permitting and
some forbidding it, reference being specially made in Alabama with a law
which might involve change by a through passenger at the Virginia line;
that there are differences between the states as to tests for the identification
of a person as a Negro. Id. at 381-83.
30. Id. at 386.
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Justice Jackson took no part in the case. Justice Rutledge concurs
in the result without opinion. Justice Black repeats his protest, ex-
pressed in other cases, against the "undue burden on commerce
formula," but acquiesces in the decision in deference to the con-
tinued acceptance of the "formula" by the Court. Justice Burton
presents a vigorous dissenting opinion, while Justice Frankfurter
says: "My brother Burton has stated with great force reasons for
not invalidating the Virginia statute. But for me Hall v. DeCuir
... is controlling."
The Morgan case31 was a victory over Jim Crow, but it seems
doubtful whether the question of racial discrimination in interstate
transportation of passengers can be finally disposed of under the
"commerce clause" of the Constitution to which it is historically and
ethically wholly alien. The "undue burden on commerce formula"
seems to have become an "undue burden" on the Supreme Court.
Is Justice Black right in thinking that the question belongs to
Congress and not to the states? Or, as Justice Burton holds, do
diverse local conditions justify local regulation by the states?
Perhaps an open-minded study of some of Justice Harlan's dis-
senting opinions, in the light of contemporary facts (including the
important fact of altered public sentiment), would help to solve the
ultimate problem of racial discrimination by common carriers,
which may have become obscured in the maze of conflicting inter-
pretations and applications of the Commerce Clause.
In Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,3 2 the Michigan Civil
Rights Act was held to require transportation of a Negro on a
round-trip excursion from Detroit to an island lying within
Canadian waters. It was conceded that the trip was "foreign com-
merce," and the decision rested on the exceptional facts of the case.
Justices Douglas and Black concurred, but inclined toward a more
fundamental ground. Justice Jackson wrote one of his characteristi-
cally pungent dissents in which the Chief Justice concurred. The
case may perhaps be of future interest in interpretations of the
"commerce clause" of the Constitution, but it is not of consequence
in a consideration of legal aspects of racial discrimination.
The Negro in Industry
The first of the few appearances in the Supreme Court of the
Negro as a factor in modem competitive industry was in 1938, 3
31. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946). See text to footnote 28
stipra.
32. 333 U. S. 28 (1948).
33. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938).
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and the second, involving more fundamental rights, in 1944.34 He
came again in 1945,"5 and again in 1949 in Graham v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. 6 In the Graham case the
facts were parallel with the Steele and Tunstall cases, and the
Court's position was the same, although only points of venue and
jurisdiction were directly decided. Justice Jackson wrote the opin-
ion and Justices Douglas and Minton took no part. If there was
any doubt before, it may be regarded as settled that "the Railway
Labor Act imposes upon the Brotherhood (of Locomotive Fire-
men and Enginemen) the duty to represent all members of the craft
without discrimination and invests a racial minority of the craft
with the right to enforce that duty." 7
In Hughes v. Superior Court,8s a Negro group ran head-on into
principles which the Supreme Court had repeatedly employed
against racial discrimination. The facts are thus summarized in
the syllabus:
"Petitioners demanded of an employer that it hire Negroes at
one of its grocery stores, as white clerks quit or were trans-
ferred, until the proportion of Negro clerks to white clerks ap-
proximated the proportion of Negro to white customers, which
was then about 50 per cent. A California state court enjoined
petitioners from picketing the employer's stores to enforce this
specific demand for selective hiring on a racial basis. For viola-
tion of the injunction petitioners were found guilty of con-
tempt and were sentenced to fine and imprisonment. The policy
of California is against discrimination on the basis of color.
Held: The injunction did not violate petitioners' right to free-
dom of speech as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
In holding that the demand for which the picketing was insti-
tuted was unlawful the Court, by Justice Frankfurter 9 quoted with
approval as follows from the California Court:
"It was just such a situation-an arbitrary discrimination upon
the basis of race and color alone, rather than a choice based
solely upon individual qualificati6n for the work to be done-
which we condemned in the Marinship case, (25 Cal. 2d 721,
737, 745 (1944).... Those seeking such discrimination would,
to the extent of the fixed proportion, make the right to work for
Lucky dependent not on fitness for the work nor on an equal
34. Steele v. L. & N. R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944) ; decided with Tun-
stall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210
(1944).
35. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88 (1945).
36. 338 U. S. 232 (1949).
37. Id. at 239.
38. 339 U. S. 460 (1950).
39. Justice Douglas took no part.
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right of all, regardless of race, to compete in an open market,
but, rather, on membership in a particular race." 40
The issue in the case was whether peaceful picketing for the pur-
pose recited was within the constitutional right of free speech; but
the special interest of Negroes was disclosed by the fact that a
brief was filed by counsel for the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People.
Racial Discrimination in Selection of Juries
Discrimination against Negroes in the selection of juries has
been a fruitful source of Supreme Court litigation ever since
Strauder v. West Virginia4l in 1880. Here the "equal protection"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was successfully invoked and
subsequent decisions have been consistent. Patton v. Mississippi,42
decided in 1947, is of the familiar type. There had been a timely
motion to quash the indictment on the ground of racial discrimina-
tion in making up the venire list for the grand jury. The Court
(by Justice Black) construed the facts and sustained this claim.
Another decision 3 of the same sort, handed down in April,
1950, merits attention because of the conspicuously liberal view of
the prevailing opinion of four Justices, presented by Justice Reed,
and the dissent of Justice Jackson. The Court expressly repudiated
proportional representation as a proper basis, and said:
"Our holding that there was discrimination in the selection of
grand jurors in this case, however, is based on another ground.
In explaining the fact that no Negroes appeared on this grand-
jury list, the commissioners said they knew of none available
who qualified; at the same time they said they chose jurymen
only from among those people with whom they were personally
acquainted. . .. An individual's qualifications for grand-jury
service... are not hard to ascertain, and with no evidence to
the contrary, we must assume that a large proportion of the
Negroes of Dallas County met the statutory requirements for
jury service. Wrhen the Commissioners were appointed as
judicial administrative officials, it was their duty to familiarize
themselves fairly with the qualifications of the eligible jurors
of the county without regard to race and color. They did not do
so here, and the result has been racial discrimination." 44
Justice Douglas took no part in the case. Justices Frankfurter,
Burton and Minton, concurring in an opinion written by Justice
40. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 463 (1950).
41. 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
42. 332 U. S. 463 (1947).
43. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950).
44. Id. at 287-89.
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Frankfurter, and Justice Clark in still another concurring opinion,
rationalized the fact situation a little differently. Justice Jackson,
who can be relied on to keep an eye on the practical administration
of justice, filed a vigorous dissent, the tenor of which is indicated
in the opening sentences:
"The case before us is that of a Negro convicted of murder by
crushing the skull of a sleeping watchman with a piece of iron
pipe to carry out a burglary. No question is here as to his guilt.
We are asked to order his release from this conviction on the
sole ground that Negroes were purposefully discriminated
against in selection of the grand jury that indicted him. It is
admitted that Negroes were not excluded from the trial jury by
which he was convicted . .. This conviction is reversed for
errors that have nothing to do with the defendant's guilt or
innocence, or with a fair trial of that issue. This conflicts with
another principle important to our law, viz., that no conviction
should be set aside for errors not affecting substantial rights of
the accused .... It is time to examine the basis for the prac-
tice."45
He concludes:
"I doubt if any good purpose will be served in the long run
by identifying the right of the most worthy Negroes to serve
on grand juries with the efforts of the least worthy to escape
punishment for crime. I cannot believe that those qualified for
grand jury service would fail to return a true bill against a
murderer because he is a Negro.. But unless they would, this
defendant has not been harmed." 46
"Due Process" in Criminal Cases
The meticulous care which the Supreme Court has quite con-
sistently exercised to secure to Negroes prosecuted from crimes,
however heinous, all their constitutional rights is well illustrated
by four recent cases which, though important and interesting, are
not thought appropriate for comment in this article.4 7
Worthy of special mention is Shepard v. State of Florida. The
case was decided per curiarn April 9, 1951, on authority of Cassell
v. Texas. The Court reversed affirmance by the Supreme Court of
Florida of conviction of a Negro for rape of a white woman. Jus-
tices Jackson and Frankfurter, in an opinion written by the former
concurring in the result, review with open indignation the sur-
45. Id. at 298, 299.
46. Id. at 304. In Moore v. New York, 333 U. S. 565 (1948), the peti-
tioners for certiorari were Negroes, but the case is not of importance here.
The New York "blue ribbon" jury law was involved.
47. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946) ; Lee v. Mississippi, 332
U. S. 742 (1948); Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U. S. 252 (1948); Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949).
[Vol. 35:625
NEGRO IN THE SUPREME COURT
roundings and incidents of the trial. They say: "Prejudicial influ-
ences outside the courtroom, becoming all too typical of a highly
publicized trial, were brought to bear on this jury with such force
that the conclusion is inescapable that these defendants were pre-
judged as guilty and that the trial was but a legal gesture to register
a verdict already dictated by the press and the public opinion which
it generated.... Under these circumstances, for the Court to re-
verse on the sole ground that the method of jury selection discrimi-
nated against the Negro race, is to stress the trivial and ignore the
important.... To me the case presents one of the best examples
of one of the worst menaces to American justice. It is on that ground
that I would reverse."4 7a
The Right to Vote
The direct and indirect violations of the Fifteenth Amendment
by some of the states, ever since it went nominally into effect in
1870, have been matters of common knowledge. There has never
been an attempt by Congress to remedy them under the power
specifically granted by Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and the Reese4 s and Cruikshank49 decisions, in 1876, tended to
support and encourage them. It was not until 1915 in the Guinn59
and Myers51 cases ("grandfather clause"), that the tide began to
turn. Since Smith v. Allwright,52 in 1944, there has been no case
involving specific denial of suffrage to Negroes, but subversive
tricks have not ceased, and one of them came before the Supreme
Court in South v. Peters,3 decided April 17, 1950. The facts do
not fully appear in the per curiam opinion, but are disclosed in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, in which Justice Black con-
curred. It.was an attack under the 14th and 17th Amendments on
the "county unit" system of voting in a Georgia primary, provid-
ing for the allotment to each county of a certain number of unit
votes ranging from six for the eight most populous counties to two
for most of the counties. Appellants, residents of the most popu-
lous county of the state, contended that their votes had on an
average but one-tenth of the weight of those in other counties and
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia to restrain adherence to the system in a forth-
47a. Shepard v. Florida, 71 Sup. Ct. 549 (1951).
48. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1876).
49. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876).
50. 238 U. S. 347 (1915).
51. 238 U. S. 368 (1915).
52. 321 U. S. 649 (1944).
53. 339 U. S. 276 (1950).
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coming Democratic primary at which candidates for United States
Senator, Governor and other state officers were to be chosen. The
District Court dismissed the petition and was sustained with only
the following comment:
"Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity
powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's
geographical distribution of electoral strength among its politi-
cal subdivisions." 54
Justice Douglas says:
"Plaintiffs show that a vote in one county will be worth over
120 times each of their votes ... that in 45 counties a vote will
be given twenty times the weight of each of theirs .... that on
a statewide average each vote outside Fulton County will have
over 11 times the weight of each vote of the plaintiffs. Popula-
tion figures show that there is a heavy Negro population in the
large cities. There is testimony in the record that only in those
areas have Negroes been able to vote in important numbers.
Yet the County Unit System heavily disfranchises that urban
Negro population. The County Unit System has indeed been
called the 'last loophole' around our decisions holding that
there must be no discrimination because of race in primary as
well as in general elections.... The creation by law of favored
groups of citizens and the grant to them of preferred political
rights is the worst of all discriminations under a democratic
system of government.... We have here a system of discrimina-
tion in primary voting that undermines the advances made in
the Nixon, Classic and Allwright cases. 55 Those decisions are
defeated by a device as deeply rooted in discrimination as the
practice which keeps a man from a voting booth because of his
race, creed or color, or which fails to count his vote after it has
been cast." '56
Conclusion
The Dred Scott decision57 marked the triumph in our highest
court of the spirit and policy which strove to dominate the Ameri-
can scene in the first half of the 19th Century. It was soon overruled
by marching armies and amendment of the Constitution. In the
public mind it still stands as an epochal decision, although its
effect as a legal precedent was practically nil. The "bad eminence"
of being the Supreme Court case which has done most to hinder
progress in the field of human rights does not belong to Scott z'.
Sandford but to Plessy v. Ferguson. The specious but convenient
54. Id. at 277.
55. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927) ; United States v. Classic,
313 U. S. 299 (1941) , Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944).
56. South v. Peters, 339 U. S. 276, 278, 279, 281 (1950).
57. 19 How. 393 (U.S. 1857).
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rule of "separate but equal," and the cynical standard for measur-
ing equality by local prejudice, were so perfectly in accord with the
temper of the smug 'Nineties that they took deep root in the law
of the land. In his dissenting opinion Justice Harlan predicted
that the decision would "prove to be as pernicious as the decision
made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." 581 For more than
fifty years it has stood as an authoritative precedent. In the light
of the Sweatt, McLaurin and Henderson decisions may we not
hope that the day is not far distant when it will be frankly over-
ruled? When the courts were closed to those who seek to per-
petuate racial or religious prejudices by neighborhood taboos;
when G. W. McLaurin began to sit where he chose in the class-
rooms of the University of Oklahoma, and Elmer Henderson no
longer hid behind curtains to eat a meal on an interstate dining
car, the "separate but equal" sophistry received deadly blows which
must in due time end its acceptance if our country is to be in fact
what we declare that it is when we pledge allegiance to the Flag-
"one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
58. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896).
